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RECENT DECISIONS
The basic policy of the marital deduction will be fulfilled by allow-
ing the deduction in these instances. Otherwise, an interest may be taxed
twice although it seems to be "fairly within the language and underlying
policy" of the statute.3 2 The liberality of the Court in construing "spe-
cific portion" offends the traditional policy of construing tax deduction
statutes against the taxpayer,8 3 but this rule of construction is not abso-
lute.3 4 The Supreme Court's ruling should have obviated the necessity for
further legislation to interpret the present Act. Ironically, the dissent
in Citizens National Bank of Evansville may best have described the ambit
of "specific portion"-" . . . something judicially rationalized as approxi-
mately equivalent . . .,,s5
THOMAS A. HARNEY.
HUSBAND AND WIFE: HUSBAND'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A BAR TO
WIFE'S ACTION FOR Loss OF CONSORTIUM. Gene Hall was seriously injured
by reason of the negligence of the United States, but was denied recovery
because of his own contributory negligence. His wife, Josephine Hall, was
denied recovery for loss of consortium. Josephine Hall then moved for a
new trial or in the alternative to amend the findings and conclusions
entered to permit her to recover for loss of consortium. Held, that under
Montana law, a husband's contributory negligence bars a wife's recovery
from a negligent third party for loss of consortium. Hall v. United States,
266 F. Supp. 671 (D. Mont. 1967).
The term "consortium" has been variously defined by different courts
and not one definition would be acceptable in all jurisdictions.' Under
8 3Gelb v. Comm 'r, aupra note 21, at 551.
3The dissent in the instant case lamented the interpretation of a tightly worded
tax statute as if it were a workmens compensation act. Instant ease at 1682. Tra-
ditionally, courts have construed tax deduction statutes against taxpayers. Empire
Trust Go. v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 623, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Stapf v. United
States, 189 F. Supp. 830 (N.D. Tex. 1960); Empire Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 94 F.2d 307
4th Cir. 1938) ; Jackson v. United States, supra note 1, at 510.
84 'And in denying the deduction, the courts have been less concerned with the
underlying philosophy of the martial deduction than they have been with main-
taining the so-called legislative principle that 'deductions should be strictly con-
strued against the taxpayer and in favor of the sovereign.' This attitude, too, has
played its part in subverting the original purpose of Congress of equalization
between the different property systems . . . . If we consider these cases and
the judicial attitude they reflect from the viewpoint of equalization, we see that the
represent a frustration of that objective."' Paul E. Anderson, Marital Deduction and
Equalization Under the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes Between Common Law and
Community Property States. 54 MICH. L. Rv. 1087, 1111 (1956).
S5Citizens Nat 'l Bank of Evansville v. United States, supra note 21, at 822.
'Technically, "consortium" is an element of damage rather than an action. The
expression has long been used by the courts, however, to denote those actions in
which injury to consortium is the major element of damage. The following defini-
tion is typical of most: "Conjugal fellowship of husband and wife, and the right
of each to the company, cooperation, affection, and aid of the other in every con-jugal relation." BLACE's LAw DiCTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
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Montana law, "consortium" to which a spouse is entitled embraces aid,
protection, affection and society of the other spouse.'
The husband's action for loss of consortium was first recognized in
1619.3 At common law, however, the wife was prevented from bringing
an action for loss of consortium. 4 Whether the wife was barred from
bringing the action because of a substantive rule of law or a procedural
principle is obscure. 5 Many somewhat dubious reasons and theories were
suggested to justify the unanimous authority denying the wife's right to
recover for loss of consortium.6 In 1950, however, a federal court pierced
the "thin veil of reasoning employed to sustain the rule," and granted
the wife a cause of action.7
Montana is one of twelve jurisdictions8 which now allow the wife to
maintain an action for loss of consortium.9 The Montana Federal District
Court concurred with the almost unanimous opinion of legal writers' °
and a growing number of jurisdictions in rejecting the "torturous, twisted
reasoning used by courts in denying the wife's right to bring the
action.""
The unanimous American rule, however, allows the husband's or
wife's contributory negligence to bar the other spouse's action for loss
of consortium. 1 2 The only conceivable judicial authority to the contrary
2Dutton v. Hightower & Lubrecht Construction Co., 214 F.Supp 298 (D. Mont. 1963).
'Guy v. Livesay, Cro.Jac. 501, 79 Eng. Rep. 428 (1619).
'41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 404 (1944); Williams,Consortium and the Common
Law, 15 S. CAL. L. REV. 810 (1963).
'There is authority that this was a substantive principle. See, Holbrook, The Change
in the Meaning of Consortium, 22 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3, (1923). But see, Root v. Root,
31 F.Supp. 562, 564 (N.D. Cal. 1940). The position of Montana courts concerning
this controversy was apparently uncertain. In Dutton, supra note 2, the Supreme
Court stated that if the denial was based on the premise that at common law the
wife obtained no right to consortium by virtue of her marriage, the common law
in that respect was changed by REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, §§ 36-101, 48-101.
(Hereinafter REVISED CODES OF MONTANA are cited R.C.M.). It was further stated
that if the common law recognized the wife's right to consortium, but simply denied
her the right to sue for its loss as a procedural matter, that was changed in Montana
by the Married Woman's Act.
6Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 1378 (1952) suggests that the principle upon which denial
of recovery rested was that the injury to the wife was too remote and indirect. Some
courts denied the wife's right of action on the theory that to permit it would result
in "double recovery" to the husband and wife for the same injury. Still others
argued that the wife had no right to the services of her husband or that no new
rights were created by married women's acts.
7Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), overruled on another point in
Smither & Co., Inc. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S.
914 (1957).
83 A.L.R.2d LATER CASE SERVICE 615-16 (1965).
'The Montana Federal District Court first granted the wife an action for loss of
consortium in Duffy v. Lipsman-Fulkerson & Co., 200 F.Supp. 71 (D. Mont. 1961).
"See Holbrook, supra note 5; Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COL.L.REv.
651 (1930); Simeone, The Wife's Action for Loss of Consortium-Progress or Not?
4 ST. Louis U. L. REV. 424 (1957).
'Supra Note 9, at 74-75.
"Annot., 42 A.L.R. 717 (1926); RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS § 494 (1965);
Chicago B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Honey, 63 F. 39, 26 L.R.A. 42 (8th Cir. 1894). One
Canadian case has held to the contrary. Wasney v. Juraszky, 1 D.L.R. 616 (1933).
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consists of an overruled 1894 case' 3 and misconstrued language in am-
biguous decisions.'4 Courts apply the established rule without question 5
perhaps based on a compulsion to follow precedent rather than upon a
deep conviction that the rule is just.16 Those courts which attempt to
justify the rule do so on the basis that one spouse's negligence is imputed
to the other' or that consortium is a derivative cause of action 8 or that
an action is denied in analogous situations and thus cannot be allowed
here.19 It has also been suggested that because a husband allows his wife
to go about unattended, he is responsible for her contributory fault and
cannot recover for loss of consortium.
20
In the instant case, the Montana U. S. District Court admitted that
the rule has been "severely criticized by the scholars. '21 The court firmly
asserted, however, that in Montana the existing signposts "point in the
direction taken by the courts rather than the scholars. '22 The District
Court judge was merely guessing as to the probable Montana law. The
decision did not deny the validity of scholarly criticism or attempt to
logically justify the established rule.
It might be helpful to reconsider the basis of this unanimous rule and
attempt to determine anew denying consortium to one spouse because of
"In Honey v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co., 59 F. 423 (S.D. Iowa 1893), the wife's
contributory negligence did not preclude the husband's recovery for loss of con-
sortium. The court reasoned: ''It cannot be successfully maintained that the right
of action in behalf of the husband is derived from the wife." The decision was
reversed in Chicago, B. N Q. By. Co. v. Honey, supra note 12. The argument denying
the derivative character of the husband's action was not answered by the reversing
court.
"In Elmore v. Illinois Terminal Railroad Co., 301 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1957), plaintiff
argued that his wife's contributory negligence did not bar his claim for consortium
and in support thereof cited the following rather ambiguous language from Monken
v. Baltimore & 0. R. R. Co., 342 Ill. App. 1, 95 N.E.2d 130, 133 (1950):
As to the judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Earl Monken, however, the
situation is not the same. The negligence of the plaintiff, Ellen Monken,
could not be imputed to her husband Earl Monken.
The court in the Elmore case did not accept counsel's argument and ruled that the
Monken decision "cannot properly be construed to announce a rule inconsistent
with the well established rule that a husband's right to recover for loss of services
of his wife is derivative only, so that if she has no valid claim for personal injuries
he is likewise without right to recover special damages flowing therefrom."
"See Annot., supra Note 12, at 718, wherein the author indicates the rule has been
''generally taken for granted.''
"This consistent failure to analyze the basis of the rule was apparent in the instant
case. See generally, Gregory, Vicarious Responsibility and Contributory Negligence,
41 YALE L.J. 831 (1932).
"
7Marbury Lumber Co. v. Westbrook, 121 Ala. 179, 25 So. 914 (1899); Winner v.
Oakland Twp., 158 Pa. 405, 27 A. 1110 (1893). For a general discussion of im-
puting negligence in this situation see annot., supra note 15, at 719; Gilmore,
Imputed Negligence, 1 Wis. L. REv. 193 (1921).
"See, e.g., Elmore, supra note 14; Callies v. Reliance Laundry Co., 188 Wis. 376, 206
N.W. 198 (1925); note 13 B.U.L. REV. 725 (1933).
"See, e.g., Instant case, at 672, wherein the court analogizes the loss of consortium
action to one for wrongful death; Callies v. Reliance Laundry Co., supra note 18.
2°Chicago, B. N Q. By. Co. v. Honey, supra note 13. To argue, on the other hand,
that because a wife allows her husband to go about unattended and is thus re-
sponsible for his contributory negligence, seems somehow less persuasive.
'Instant case, at 672.
22Id.
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the other's contributory negligence is consistent with the legal, economic,
and social atmosphere of contemporary society.
It is sometimes reasoned that consortium is a derivative action. Thus,
if the injured spouse was contributorily negligent, the spouse seeking
consortium derives an inherently defective cause of action. 23 This theory
has been largely discredited by both the cases2 4 and legal writers.25 The
action of one spouse for personal injuries resulting from the tort is en-
tirely separate, distinct, and independent from the other spouse's action
for loss of consortium. The claim for loss of consortium never did belong
to the injured spouse and therefore cannot be "derived" from that
spouse. 26 This conclusion is further supported by the inability of the
injured spouse to destroy the claim for loss of consortium through re-
lease, settlement, or assignment. 27 Moreover, a judgment in one spouse's
action for personal injuries is not res judicata to to the other spouse's
action for loss of consortium. 28
A somewhat similar line of reasoning imputes the contributory negli-
gence of the injured spouse to the one seeking redress for loss of con-
sortium.29 Contributory negligence has been criticized as a harsh and
questionable doctrine. 30 A wrongdoer is not relieved of liability by con-
tributory negligence because of any merit in his own position. The plain-
tiff is simply unable to recover because of a deviation from the required
standard of care.3 1 Imputed contributory negligence has been subjected
to even more severe attack.32 When contributory negligence is imputed to
the completely innocent spouse of an injured part to bar the action for
loss of consortium, the injustice becomes apparent. As previously indi-
cated, the consortium action is separate and distinct from the action for
personal injuries.33 The spouse suing for loss of consortium is seeking
redress for injury to entirely different interests invaded by an indepen-
dent wrong to her. It would seem completely irrelevant that the other
spouse has been barred by contributory negligence.
"See supra note 18.
2ASee, e.g., Ritaffer v. Argonne Co., supra note 7, at 815.
2Prosser, Torts § 119 3d ed. 1964); Gregory, The Contributory Negligence of
Plaintiff's Wife or Child in an Action for Loss of Services, B U. CHI.L.REv. 173
(1935); James, Imputed Contributory Negligence, 14 LA.L.REv. 340 (1954).
"2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 23.8, at 1278 (1956).
2Id.; PROSSER, supra note 25, at 911, 915.
"See, e.g., Wolf v. DuPuis, 233 Ore. 317, 378 P.2d 707 (1963); Smittle v. Eberle,
353 P.2d 121 (Okla. 1960).
2'SuPRA note 17.
'See, Eldredge, Contributory Negligences an Outmoded Defense that Should be
Abolished, 43 A.B.A.J. 52 (1957); Green, Illinois Negligence Law, 39 ILL. L. REV.
36 (1944).
"RESTATEMENT '(SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1965).
'See, GREGORY, LEGISLATIVE Loss DISTRIBUTION IN NEGLIGENCE CASES 148 (1936);
Gilmore, supra note 17; James, Imputed Negligence and Vicarious Liabilities: The
Study of a Paradox, 10 U. FLA.L.REv. 48 (1957); Keeton, Imputed Contributory
Negligence, 13 TEXAS L. REV. 161 (1936); Lessler, The Proposed Discard of the
Doctrine of Imputed Contributory Negligence, 20 FORDHAm L. REV. 156 (1951).
'Supra notes 23-28.
[Vol. 29
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It is allegedly established that negligence will not be "imputed" to a
plaintiff unless his relationship to the person whose negligence is involved
is such as to make him liable for that person's negligence if it resulted in
injury to a third person.3 4 One spouse is not liable for the other's torts85
and negligence is not imputed on the basis of the marital relationship.36
These general rules have been recognized in Montana.37  There is no
logical reason why these well-established tort principles should not be
applied to actions for loss of consortium. As it now stands, the law per-
mits a wife to recover for injuries to person or property despite her hus-
band's contributory negligence, but denies recovery for loss of consortium
when her husband was contributorily negligent. 38
Some courts have analogized the action for loss of consortium with
that of a beneficiary or representative under a wrongful death statute.3 9
The court in the instant case justified its decision with the following
statement :4o
The same criticisms made of the rule that contributory negligence is
a bar in a loss of consortium action can be and are leveled at the rule
making contributory negligence a bar in a wrongful death action,
and yet in Montana contributory negligence is a bar in the wrongful
death action.
This statement, of course, does not speak to the justice of denying the
action in either, case. Some courts properly differentiate the right to
recover under a wrongful death statute from the right to redress for loss
of consortium on the ground that wrongful death was created by legisla-
tion and was non-existent at common law. 41 The wrongful death statutes,
having created a new cause of action, have been strictly construed. The
type of analogy employed by the court in the instant case has therefore
been described as highly inaccurate and confusing.42
Numerous analogies could be suggested as supporting the wife's
action for loss of consortium when the husband has been contributorily
negligent. In all jurisdictions, for example, a wife can recover for loss of
consortium when the injury to her husband is the result of an intentional
8
'This has become known as the "both ways" rule. Origin of this term is attributed
to Gregory, Vicarious Besponsibility and Contributory Negligence, 41 YALE L.J.
831 (1932). It was incorporated into RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 485, com-
ment a (1934).
'In about two-thirds of the states there are specific statutory provisions making
the wife fully responsible for her own torts. These statutes are collected in the
Note, 3 U. Fla. L. Rev. 206 (1950).
'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TonTs § 487 (1965).
Laird v. Berthelote, 63 Mont. 122, 206 P. 455, 464 (1922).
R4Ross v. Cuthbert, 79 Ore. 625, 397 P.2d 529, 534 (1964) (dissenting opinion of
J. O'Connell).
"See supra note 19.
"Instant case, at 672.
"Honey v. C. B. N Q. By. Co., supra note 13. The propriety of this distinction was
also noted in Annot., 42 A.L.R. 717, 718 (1926).
"Greggory, supra note 25, at 182.
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act 3 such as sale of liquor or habit forming drugs to the husband. 44
She may also recover in an action for alienation of affections 45 and crim-
inal conversation. 46 The wife is not barred from recovery in these situa-
tions although the husband has engaged in contributorily culpable con-
duct.47 In actions by the wife for alienation of affections or criminal con-
versations, joinder of the husband was not permitted at common law be-
cause it was considered unjust for the husband to benefit from his own
misconduct.48 The misconduct, however, was not imputed to the wife to
bar her action.
Western civilization is founded upon the family as a basic and vital
social institution. The importance of marriage in Montana and other
states is evidenced by the many statutory provisions governing the rela-
tionship.4 9 The action for consortium seeks to protect this relational
interest between husband and wife.50 This interest has not been afforded
a degree of protection commensurate with its importance.
It is arguable that strong public policy favors an action for loss of
consortium even though the injured spouse has been contributorily negli-
gent. Physical disability of one spouse is never in itself a sufficient
ground for divorce. There is no legal opportunity for the other spouse to
remarry, and enjoy a normal, healthy family relationship. A sick, lame,
or totall incapacitated spouse is certainly a less desirable companion than
one capable of fulfilling the usual marital obligations. In some cases, a
spouse might be charged with the lifelong burden of nursing an invalid.
These burdens which the wife might unexpectedly have to bear were
among the compelling reasons leading to her action for loss of con-
sortium. 51 The suffering to an innocent wife which results from loss of
consortium is certainly not lessened by the presence of contributory
negligence on the part of her husband.
"Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N.Y. 584, 23 N.E. 17 (1889); Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 690 (1939).
"Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P.2d 147, 130 A.L.R. 341 (1940); Annot., 75
A.L.R.2d 833 (1961).
OMurray v. Murray, 30 N.M. 557, 240 P. 303 (1925); Moelleur v. Moelleur, 55 Mont.
30, 173 P. 419 (1918); Wallace v. Wallace, 85 Mont. 492, 279 P. 374 (1929).
"6Oppenheim v. Kridel, 236 N.Y. 156, 140 N.E. 227, 28 A.L.R. 320 (1923).
17The wife can recover even though the husband himself was the pursuer or seducer,
so long as there was encouragement on the part of the other woman. Hart v. Knapp,
76 Conn. 135, 55 A. 1021 (1903); Norris v. Stoneham, Tex. Civ. App. 46 S.W.2d
363 (1932).
"Eliason v. Draper, 25 Del. (2 Boyce) 1, 77 A. 572, 573 (1910) (dictum); Rott v.
Goehring, 33 N.D. 412, 157 N.W. 294, 297 (1916) (dictum).
I-R.C.M., 1947, §§ 48-101 and 48-141.
1'Green, RelationaZ Interests, 29 ILL. L. REV. 460, 462 (1936).
"Missouri Pacific Transportation Co. v. Miller, 227 Ark. 351, 299 S.W.2d 41, 46
(1957); Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill.2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960); Montgomery v.
Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1960). In Montana, R.C.M., 1947, 36-103,
provides that if the husband is unable to support himself and his wife out of his
property or by his labor, the wife "must assist him as far as she is able."
R.C.M., 1947, 36-121 provides: "The wife must support the husband, when he
has not deserted her, out of her separate property, when he has no separate property,
and he is unable, from infirmity, to support himself."
[Vol. 29
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Montana initially permitted the wife a claim for loss of consortium
because the common law rule had been "demolished as being completely
unreasonable and illogical. 15 2 Other courts examined the orthodox rule
"in light of present day realities" and concluded there was no judicial
sagacity in "Continually looking backward and parroting the words and
analyses of other courts so as to embalm for posterity the legal concepts
of the past."5 3 These same judicial declarations might well be used as a
basis for overruling the common law principle denying one spouse dam-
ages for loss of consortium because of the other's contributory negligence.
In addition to the considerations previously mentioned, another
factor to be considered is the increasing availability and utilization of
liability insurance. 54 In most of the modern cases involving loss of con-
sortium it would appear that the defendant is insured. Although seldom
mentioned in judicial opinions 55 there is an increasing belief that personal
injury loss should not be considered as merely the individual concern of
those involved in accidents. 6 Human failures in modern, mechanized
society cause a large and fairly regular number of personal injuries.
There is an increasing relization that these failures involve little or noth-
ing in the way of personal moral shortcoming or ethical fault.5 7 These
losses should, therefore, be distributed as part of the social cost, either
through assumption of the burden of compensation by the enterprise or
individual causing the injury or through insurance. If contributory negli-
gence and imputed contributory negligence bar any claim for loss of
consortium, the principles of loss compensation and loss distribution will
be effectively thwarted.
Although authority is unanimously to the contrary, there is a strong
temptation to venture an opinion that some jurisdiction will break away
from the well-established rule reiterated in the principal case. Common
law rules have a capacity for growth, adaption, and modification. Courts
recognize that whenever old rules are found unsuited to present condi-
tions, they should be cast aside and a new rule declared which is in har-
mony with those conditions .5  The development and limitations on the
action for loss of consortium have been almost exclusively judicial.59 In
as much as any obstacles to the action have been "judge invented," there
is not conceivable reason why they cannot be "judge destroyed." 60
LAURENCE E. ECK.
I'Supra note 9, at 74-75.
"Dini v. Naiditch, supra note 51, at 892.
"PROSSzR, supra note 25 at 563.
T Id. at 562.
M8See, e.g., EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT (1951); Malone, Damage
Suits and the Contagious Principle of Workmen's Compensation, 12 LA.L.REv. 231
(1952).
5'James and Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 63 HARV. L. REV.
769 (1950).
"Missouri Pacific Transportation Company v. Miller, supra note 51, at 46.
'See, Yonner v. Adams, 53 Del. 229, 167 A.2d 171 (1961).
'Montgomery v. Stephan, supra note 51, at 235.
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